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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of auction theory is based on symmetric-game models in which 
bidders observe private signals from an ordered set and, in (pure-strategy) 
equilibrium, bid the same strictly monotonic function of their signals. (See, 
for instance, the survey of Milgrom (1985).) Some symmetric auction 
games cannot possibly have such equilibria, however. Consider the follow-
ing class: 
Two objects, known to be identical, are to be sold by a single seller at a pair of 
sealed-bid, second-price auctions with no reserve prices and no entry fees. The 
auctions occur one after the other, quickly enough that no participants discount 
anything, and the price paid in the first auction is announced publicly before 
the bidding in the second auction. There are at least three bidders, and each 
bidder desires only one of the objects; so the winner of the first auction does 
not participate in the second. Finally, each bidder's signal is a random variable 
affiliated with the identical true common values of the objects and, conditional 
on this true value, the signals are independent and have identical atomless 
distributions. 
2No game in this class can have a symmetric equilibrium at which in the 
first auction each bidder bids the same strictly increasing function of her 
signal. To see the reason for this, note first that if there were such an 
equilibrium the bidder whose signal turns out to be second highest is at a 
major disadvantage in the second auction, since all other bidders can infer 
her signal (by inverting the bid function), whereas she knows only that 
their signals are lower and that one signal was higher. Consider, then, the 
position of a bidder in the first auction whose signal is very near, but does 
not quite equal, the lowest possible signal. Conditional on the (unlikely but 
germane) event that this signal is the first or second highest among all 
bidders, it is with very high probability the second highest. Consequently, 
this bidder has much more to gain than lose by deviating down to the 
lowest bid in the range of the equilibrium bid function. There can 
therefore be no symmetric equilibrium of this type. [In Bikhchandani's 
(1988) analysis of repeated second-price auctions, a reputation-building 
bidder bids aggressively to reveal his signal, as it will intensify the "winner's 
curse" for the other bidders and serve to deter competition subsequently. 
(Similar effects are found in Avery's (1994) jump-bidding equilibria of 
English auctions.) Here, by contrast, the effect is to bid cautiously to 
conceal information that could be used by opponents in subsequent 
auctions.] 
We do not know what equilibria may look like for all of the games in the 
above class, but we present below some equilibria for examples from a 
related class in which signals can take on only two values, and, not 
surprisingly given the above, these equilibria involve pooling: bidders with 
different signals sometimes make the same bid in the first auction. (Some 
equilibrium bids are also randomized, but this comes more from the 
discrete nature of the signal space than from the rest of the auction 
structure.) Perhaps more importantly, however, some of the qualitative 
features of these equilibria run counter to what might be expected from 
the literature based on symmetric mono tonic equilibria. (Much of the folk 
wisdom appears to come from Milgrom and Weber (1982b), a collection of 
widely circulated preliminary results and conjectures.) In particular, it is 
not always true that 
1. The more information the seller can credibly reveal, the better for 
the seller (weakly). 
2. The price in the second auction is on average higher (weakly) than 
the price in the first auction. 
3. The more bidders there are, the better (weakly) for the seller. 
3The rest of the paper is devoted to the examples. In Section 2, we 
construct a symmetric partial-pooling equilibrium for each member of a 
symmetric class of these games. We then construct symmetric equilibria 
for another class of games that is identical to the first class, except that the 
price in the first auction is not announced before the second. We show 
numerically that the seller can be made either better or worse off on 
average, depending on parameter values, by announcing the first-auction 
price. (Perry and Reny (1997) have recently provided another example in 
which the seller is unambiguously made worse off when he commits to 
reveal what he knows. Their set-up, however, is different from the one in 
this paper.) Thus the price in the first auction is a piece of information the 
seller may not wish to commit to revealing before the second auction. This 
runs counter to the intuition that by revealing information the seller 
ameliorates the "winner's curse." That intuition is evidently incomplete in 
cases like this one, at least, where the seller's information is partly 
endogenous. 
In Section 3, we exhibit an equilibrium for an asymmetric game of a 
similar sort in which price falls in expectation not only conditional on some 
first-auction price realizations, but in a stronger ex ante expected sense as 
well. Although "afternoon effects" are commonly observed in practice 
(e.g., Ashenfelter, 1989), their possibility runs counter to two intuitive 
arguments about equilibria: (1) that there is increased competition (and 
hence higher prices on average) in the second auction after both one of 
the objects and one of the bidders have been removed, since the ratio of 
bidders to objects is now higher; and (2) that if expected prices in the two 
auctions were not equal, ex ante, a bidder could do better by bidding less 
aggressively in one of the auctions and more aggressively in the other. The 
example in Section 3 also has the feature that fewer bidders can make the 
seller better off, although this feature can be observed in simpler single-
object auctions as well. 
Section 4 contains additional discussion, and some details of the argu-
ments from Sections 2 and 3 are left to the Appendix. 
Aside from exposing the falsity of some myths through special examples, 
there may be an additional benefit in presenting the equilibrium construc-
tions of this paper. The question of how best to auction multiple objects 
has been of great interest lately, and the answer has been elusive, primar-
ily because the construction of equilibria under alternative scenarios has 
been limited to some very simple examples. (The recent spectrum auctions 
of the Federal Communications Commission in the V.S. have sparked 
interest in the subject most recently. McMillan (1994) discusses the design 
issues faced by the F.C.C.) The constructions of this paper may aid in the 
search for a general construction that can be used for sequential designs. 
42. SYMMETRIC EXAMPLES 
There are three players. At the beginning of the game, each player 
secretly observes the signal 1 with probability q and the signal 0 with 
probability (1 - q). The players' signals are independent of each other. 
The value of either of the two objects to be auctioned to each of the 
players is the sum of the signals. No player wants more than one object, 
however, and the winner of the first auction is excluded from the second. 
The rules are sealed-bid, second-price in both auctions, with the usual 
unbiased tie-breaking rule. (Sealed-bid, second-price auctions are rare. 
The literature's interest in them stems from the similarity of some of their 
theoretical properties to those of the widely used, but more complicated, 
English auctions. That similarity is less compelling here: in a pair of 
sequenced English auctions, for instance, the seller would be unable to 
keep secret the winning bid of the first auction.) 
2.1. Price-Announced Case 
When the second highest bid in the first auction is announced before 
the second auction, a pure strategy in the game is for each of the two 
possible signals (types): a bid in the first auction together with a function 
mapping announced prices to bids for the second game. 
For q E (0, 1), let 
2q - 2 + ";(1 - q)( 4 - q) 
p(q) = q . 
Note that p(q), which is the equilibrium pooling probability for the I-types 
in the first auction, declines from 0.75 to 0 as q goes from 0 to 1. The 
following behavioral strategy forms a symmetric equilibrium. 
O-Type 
First auction: Bid 
b = 2qp(q) 
(q) - qp(q) + 1 - q 
Second auction: Bid 
{ 
3q-2qp(q) 
:(q) = 2q - 2qp(q) + 1 if the 1st-auction price was = b( q) 
if the 1st-auction price was > b( q). 
I-Type 
5First auction: With probability p(q) bid b(q), and with probability 
1 - p(q), randomize according to the cumulative distribution function 
(c.d.f.) 
Z (x) == (x - 2)(1 - q) - (3 - x)qp(q) 
q (3 - x)q(1 - p(q)) 
[
2-2q +3qp(q) ] 
on 1 ( ) ,2 + q . 
-q+qp q 
(It is easy to check that Zq is a genuine c.d.f. for each q and that the 
support of Zq always lies above 2, while b(q) is always below 1; so a I-type 
who does not pool with the O-types always outbids both the O-types and the 
pooled I-types in the first auction.) 
Second auction: If the first-auction price was greater than own bid, 
bid 3; if the first-auction price was equal to own bid, which was greater 
than b(q), bid 3; if the first-auction price was equal to own bid, which was 
less than or equal to b(q), bid 
7q + 2 - 6qp(q) 
c(q) == 2q + 1 - 2qp(q) . 
(Note that e(q) < 1 and 2 < c(q) < 3, so a I-type who pooled in the first 
auction will always outbid a O-type in the second auction.) 
At this equilibrium, the O-types break even on average in both auctions, 
competing away the profits in Bertrand fashion. The I-types who do not 
pool are the only possible winners in the first auction whenever they are 
present. Higher bids in the support of Zq increase a I-type's chance of 
winning in the first auction, but this is offset by the higher expected price 
involved. The pooling bid b(q) equates the expected profit from winning 
the first auction (and paying b(q)) with losing (with its chances of winning 
the second auction and paying only e(q) < b(q)). The pooled I-types 
receive lower expected payoffs than the nonpooled I-types in the first 
auction, but compensate with higher expected payoffs in the second 
auction. The argument that this strategy forms a symmetric equilibrium is 
found in the Appendix. We conjecture that it is the only symmetric one. 
Expected prices in the various possible events can be found in Table I 
(where dependence on q is suppressed and where EZi :j denotes the 
expectation of the ith-order statistic from a random sample of size j 
distributed according to the c.d.f. Z). 
Since the order statistics from Z always lie between 2 and 3, it is obvious 
from this table that conditional on the first-auction price, the expected 
6TABLE I 
Prob. Prob. Auction 1 price Prob. Auction 2 price 
(1 - q)3 b e 
3(1 - q)2q b e Cl -p)2 E22:2 2 
3(1 - q)q2 2p(1 - p) b e 
p2 b C/3 c 2/3 e rp )' E22:3 3 q3 3(1 _ p)2p E22:2 3 
3(1 - p)p2 b C 
3 b c 
second-auction price can be either higher or lower than the first-auction 
price. Some algebra reveals that the ex ante expected prices are 
E(Pl) = 6q3 - 39q2 + 72q - 36 + (6q2 - 24q + 18h/4 - 5q + q2, 
E( P2) = -12q3 + 60q2 - 81q + 36 
- (12q2 - 30q + 18)J4 - 5q + q2 . 
These are graphed against q in Fig. 1, from which we see that the price 







FIG. 1. E(Pl) s E(P2)' 
72.2. Price-Not-Announced Case 
When the second-highest bid in the first auction is not announced, a 
pure strategy is an ordered pair of bids-one for each auction. The 
following behavioral strategy forms a symmetric equilibrium. 
O-Type 
First auction: Randomize according to the c.dJ. Fq , which is the 
unique function satisfying 
In(1 - (1 - q)F(x)) = (1 - q)xF(x) 
q [ 
-qlnq] 
on q, . 1 - q 
(That Fq is a genuine c.dJ. for each q is verified in the Appendix.) 
Second auction: If the first-auction randomization produced x (and 
lost), bid 
(Note that gq is monotone increasing, that g/q) = q, and that 
gq( -q In q/(l - q)) = 1.) 
I-Type 
First auction: Randomize according to the c.dJ. 
(l-q)x+qlnq 
H(x)=-----
q - q(3-x) [ 
-q In q ] 
on ,3q - q In q . 
1 - q 
(That Hq is a genuine c.dJ. for each q is straightforward to check') 
Second auction: Bid 3. 
In this equilibrium, there is no pooling: the I-types always outbid the 
O-types. The O-types again break even on average in the pair of auctions, 
but not in each auction individually: those who bid higher in the first 
auction do worse on average in the first auction when they win it, but they 
profit more on average in the second auction from the informational rent 
they gain when they lose in the first auction at a higher bid. (Randomiza-
tion over linked pairs of bids is also found in the equilibria of Lang and 
Rosenthal (1991). The interpretation of the linking there is somewhat 
different, however.) For the I-types, a loss in the first auction must have 
been to another I-type, so a bid of 3 in the second auction is best against 
the strategy in question. The randomization in the first auction simply 
trades off higher win probabilities against higher prices, with proper 
accounting for the expected profits in the second auction after a loss in the 
8first. Notice that the bottom of the support of H is exactly the same as the 
top of the support of F. 
The argument that this strategy forms a symmetric equilibrium is found 
in the Appendix. Again we think it is the unique symmetric one. (With a 
different tie-breaking rule, however, there is at least one more, at least 
when q ~ 0.25. See Section 4.) Expected prices in the various possible 
events can be found in Table 11 (where dependence on q is again 
suppressed). 
Again, it is easy to see that conditional on the first-auction price, the 
expected second-auction price can be either higher or lower. Some algebra 
(see the Appendix) reveals, however, that ex ante the expected prices in 
both auctions are exactly the same, namely 3q(1 + q2)j2. 
2.3. Revenue Comparisons 
The expected seller's revenue is the sum of the ex ante expected prices. 
In the price-announced case, this is 
In the price-not-announced case, it is simply 3q(1 + q2). In Fig. 2 the 
difference in the expected seller's revenue between the first and second 
cases is graphed against q. Figure 2 reveals that the revenue ranking 
switches near 0.80, so when q is high, the seller does better by committing 
to not revealing the first-auction price. 
3. AN ASYMMETRIC EXAMPLE 
In this section, there are only two possible common values, 0 and 1, for 
the identical objects. A set of two informed bidders knows the true value 
V. A set of two uninformed bidders knows only that both values are 
Prob. 
(1 _ q)3 
30-q)2q 
3(1 - q)q2 
q3 
TABLE II 










EgFj:j denotes the expectation of g of the i th of j-order 
statistics from F and EgF denotes the expectation of g of a 
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FIG. 2. Revenue difference. 
equally likely. We assume first that the price in the first auction is not 
announced before the second auction. 
We restrict attention to strategies in which, from familiar dominance 
considerations, in the second auction the informed bid V and the unin-
formed bid 0; so only the first-auction bids need to be derived. (Note that 
there are non-type-symmetric equilibria in which one informed bidder bids 
o in the first auction while the other bids V, and the uninformed all bid O. 
Hence, since there is at most one nonzero bidder in each auction, the 
prices are constant at 0 in these non-type-symmetric equilibria.) At the 
unique equilibrium of interest, the c.dJ. for the bid of the I-informed in 





7 - m 
4 
7 - m 
ifx~ ----
4 
whereas the c.dJ. of the bid of the uninformed is 
U(x) = 
(m -3)(4-3x) 






7 - m 
ifx~ ---
4 







o 0.1 0.2 0.3 x 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
FIG. 3. lex). 
The expected price in the first auction is 




+ 2 f 7 - VU)/\I(x)(1 - I(x))U(x)U'(x) dx 
o 
+ 2t7 - VU)/\I(x)U(X)(1 - U(x))I'(x) dx 
o 
+ t 7 - VU )/4x(U(x))\1 - I(x))I'(x) dx 
o 




o 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 x 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
FIG. 4. vex). 
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The first four terms above are for the case V = 1; the fifth term is for 
V = o. The expected price in the second auction is just the probability that 
V = 1 and an uninformed wins the first auction: 
Numerical evaluations produce 0.38 for the first auction and 0.24 for the 
second, so the ex ante expected price declines. 
Next, notice that if the price in the first auction is announced before the 
second auction, the equilibrium described above remains an equilibrium in 
the sense that all players ignore the announcement and bid as above. An 
additional type-symmetric equilibrium is present in the price-announced 
game, however. In it, both informed bid V in both auctions, whereas the 
uninformed bid 0 in the first auction and bid the announced first-auction 
price in the second. This equilibrium is better for the seller and possesses 
no "afternoon effect," of course. 
Finally, notice that if there is only one uninformed bidder, there is an 
equilibrium for the price-not-announced game in which the uninformed 
bids 1 in both auctions, whereas the informed both bid V in both auctions. 
This means the seller earns 2V. On average, therefore, the seller earns 1 in 
total, which is more than at the randomized equilibrium above. Of course, 
if there are at least three informed, the seller again earns 2V at the 
obvious equilibrium. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. That there should be no upward or downward trend in prices over 
time on average in sequenced auctions seems to be a well-understood 
property of certain environments. For instance, in an independent-
private-values setting, Weber (1983) studies the sequential sale of k 
objects to risk-neutral bidders who each desire only one object. He shows 
that the equilibrium price sequence is a martingale. The result is estab-
lished with an arbitrage argument: if the sequence of prices were, for 
instance, downward drifting, then, in equilibrium, bidders with high values 
would bid low in the first auction, preferring to bid more aggressively later. 
But this behavior produces higher prices later, contradicting the assumed 
downward drifting sequence. (The risk-neutrality assumption is important 
for this result: if bidders were risk averse, then the sequence of prices 
could well be downward drifting, as the arbitrage argument would be 
complicated when a bidder incorporates in his current bid the risk associ-
ated with future prices (see McMee and Vincent, 1993). Other variations 
12
of Weber's model also have declining prices, e.g., Bernhardt and Scoones 
(1994) and Gale and Hausch (1992).) 
2. A similar arbitrage argument helps explain our finding that ex 
ante expected prices are equal for the two auctions in the price-not-
announced case of Section 2.2: Although our model has common values, 
when the price is not announced, no information about other bids is 
revealed from a loss in the first auction beyond what an individual could 
deduce for herself a priori. Hence, if the ex ante expected price path were 
not constant, bidders would have incentives to bid more aggressively in the 
auction having the lower price and higher in the other auction. 
3. Information revelation considerations are generally more impor-
tant for sequential sales of common-valued objects than for the private-
values model. To the extent that the equilibrium is separating under 
common values, bids reveal information that can be used subsequently. 
Even if the price is not announced, a bidder who has lost in the first 
auction has more information at the beginning of the second auction about 
the common value than she had originally. (If there were a monotone, 
symmetric equilibrium, for instance, she would know that there is a bidder 
with a higher estimate than hers') In the private-values case, such informa-
tion is worthless; but in the common-values case, it must be taken into 
account in computing the optimal bid. Thus, in Weber (1983), the symmet-
ric equilibrium strategies for a sequential second-price auction are actually 
the same whether the price is announced or not. Of course, this is not 
generally the case for the common-values case. (See, however, Section 3.) 
4. In a single-object, common-values setting, Milgrom and Weber 
(1982a) show that the seller can raise expected revenue by committing to a 
policy of publicly releasing whatever information he learns. The released 
information adds an additional link between a bidders's information and 
the selling price, and thereby reduces the "winner's curse." Thus players 
are willing to bid more aggressively on average, which is advantageous to 
the seller. Matters are not so simple in the case of sequential sale, 
however. If a player knows that his bid may reveal information, then he 
has an incentive to dissemble. 
5. The asymmetric model in Section 3 illustrates a sense in which the 
seller is made worse off by the presence of additional bidders. An even 
simpler instance of it can be seen in a single-object, common-value model 
(again sealed-bid, second-price auction rules) in which the object is worth 
o or 1 with equal prior probabilities. (The phenomenon is familiar from 
Rosenthal (1980). We are grateful to Ruqu Wang for this example.) If it is 
common knowledge that there are two bidders and they are both unin-
formed, then at the unique equilibrium they both bid 1/2. If a third bidder 
is added who knows the true value, at the unique type-symmetric equilib-
13
rium he bids the true value and the uninformed bid O. Thus the presence 
of the informed bidder destroys the competitive pressure that was present 
in the two-bidder case. 
6. For the price-not-announced model of Section 2.2, with a differ-
ent tie-breaking rule there is at least one additional symmetric equilibrium 
when q ::; 0.25. The rule is: If a tie involves more I-types than O-types, 
then the O-types lose and the tied I-types win with equal probabilities. If a 
tie involves at least as many O-types as I-types, then the I-types lose and 
the tied O-types win with equal probabilities. (This rule is not usable unless 
the auctioneer can observe the types, but the example may be interesting 
anyway, in light of the existence result in Simon and Zame (1990).) The 
type-symmetric equilibrium strategy is: In the first auction, all bidders bid 
3q/(2q + 1); in the second auction, all O-types bid 0 and aU1-types bid 3. 
We leave the verification to the reader. 
7. This paper leaves open several interesting questions. These in-
elude: 
i. When bidders' signals can take on values in a continuum, since 
the standard monotone-bid equilibrium constructions do not work in our 
sequential setting, what does work? 
ii. Under what conditions are simultaneous designs superior for the 
seller (cf. Rosenthal and Wang, 1996)? 
iii. What information about early auctions is it optimal for the seller 
to reveal later? 
APPENDIX 
Equilibrium from Section 2.1 
Again, we suppress dependence on q for convenience. For a O-type in 
the second auction, if the price was > b in the first auction, the other two 
bidders must be I-types, and so the object is worth 2. By the usual 
argument in second-price single-object auctions, therefore, the bidder 
must bid 2. If the price was b in the first auction, a bid of e earns in 
expectation 
( 
2P ) 1 22 1 (1 - e)2q(1 - q) 1 - - - + (-e)(l - q) --3 2 32' 
which is O. A bid below e always loses, so earns 0; a bid in (e, c) changes 
the tie-breaking factors of 1/2 in the above to 1 and so again produces 
zero expected payoff. A bid of c or more is weakly dominated by a bid of 2, 
since the objects can be worth no more than 2, and so cannot result in 
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positive expected payoff. So there are no profitable deviations by a O-type 
in the second auction, where 0 payoffs are expected. 
For a O-type in the first auction, a bid of b earns in expectation 
A bid below b always loses and leads to zero expected payoffs in the 
second auction. A bid above 2 is again dominated by a bid of 2. From the 
last equation, a bid between band 2 breaks even when it wins, and 
produces no information that can be profitably used in the second auction 
when it loses, and so there are no profitable deviations by a O-type. 
For a 1-type in the second auction, if the first-auction price exceeded the 
bidder's own bid, the other two bidders must be 1-types, and so the object 
is worth 3. The bidder must bid 3 for the usual reasons. If in the first 
auction the player's bid set the price and was above b, by bidding 3 he bids 
the true value when that value is 3, and ensures winning and paying 2 
when that value is 2, so the usual argument applies again. For the event 
when the price and his bid were both b in the first auction, the expected 
payoff from bidding c in the second auction is 
2{ 21 1) 11 (3 - c)q p2 __ + 2p(1 - p)- + (2 - c)2q(1- q)p--
3 2 2 32 
( P) 22 + (2 - e)2q(1 - q) 1 - p +"3 + (1 - e)(l - q) 3' 
The value chosen for c makes the first two terms above sum to 0; so 
deviations into (e, C), which eliminate these two terms, make no payoff 
difference, and deviations into (c, 3), which change all of the (1/2)-tie-break 
probabilities in these two terms to 1, also make no payoff difference. Bids 
less than or equal to e and equal to 3 obviously do no better. 
For a 1-type in the first auction, a bid of b produces the expected 
payoffs: 
221 P 21 (3 - b)q p - + (2 - b)2q(1 - q)- + (1 - b)(l - q) -
3 3 3 
( P) 22 +(2-e)2q(1-q) 1-p+"3 +(l-e)(l-q) 3' 
Substituting for band e and simplifying, this becomes 
(1) 
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For a I-type in the first auction, a bid of x > b produces the expected 
payoff: 
q2((3 - y)[(1- p)22Z(y)Z'(y) + 2p(1 - p)Z'(Y)] dy 
b 
+ 2q(1 - q)(l - p) 1\2 - y)Z'(y) dy 
b 
+(3 - b)q2p2 + (2 - b)2q(1 - q)p + (1 - b)(l _ q)2. 
For bids in the support of Z to produce equal payoffs, therefore, 
(3 _X)q2[(1- p)22Z(x)Z'(x) + 2p(1 - p)Z'(x)] 
+(2 -x)2q(1-q)(1-p)Z'(x) = 0, 
which is satisfied uniquely by the Z defined earlier. In this case, the 
expected payoff from bidding in this support is given by its value at the 
lower limit of the support, namely, 
(3 - b)q2p2 + (2 - b)2q(1 - q)p + (1 - b)(l _ q)2. 
Substituting for b, this becomes 
(2) 
Equating (1) and (2) generates the quadratic equation whose (relevant) 
solution is p, defined earlier. 
Since Z is atomless, deviations above its support do no better than 
bidding the upper limit of that support, and deviations below its support 
are no better than the lower limit. Deviations below b are obviously worse 
than bidding b. 
Equilibrium from Section 2.2 
To compute g(x), pick r to maximize expected second-auction profit for 
a O-type when the first-auction companion bid is x from the support of F 
and when the other bidders bid according to the hypothesized strategy: 
2jg-l(r) (1 - q) (-g(z))2(1 - F(x))F'(z) dz 
z=q 




Differentiating with respect to r, equating the result to zero, and setting 
g(x) = r produces 
(1 - q)( -g(x))(l - F(x)) + q(1- g(x)) = 0, (4) 
and hence the function g in Section 2.2. To see that this g(x) is the best 
companion in the second auction to the bid x from the support of F in the 
first auction, consider first an alternative r E (g(x), 1]. The difference 
between the payoff to the pair of bids x and r and the pair x and g(x) is 
the expression in (3) with the lower limits of the integrals replaced by x. 
Substituting the expression for g(.) from Section 2.2, this is clearly nega-
tive. A similar argument takes care of a companion bid rE [q, x). A 
companion bid E (1,3) is no better than 1, a companion below q is no 
better than q, and a companion of 3 or more is obviously hopeless. 
Now, assuming that the companion bid is g(x), the break-even condition 
for the O-types in the first auction is 
2fX (1 - q) (-z)2F(z)F'(z) dz 
z=q 
2 fX +(1 - q) 2(1 - F(x)) (-g(z))F'(z) dz 
z=q 
+ 2q(1 - q) r (1 - g(z))F'(z) dz = O. 
z=q 
This clearly holds at q. It will be satisfied on (q,( -q In q)/(l - q)] if its 
derivative is zero there. This condition on the derivative (simplified) is 
(1 - q)( -x)F(x)F'(x) + (1 - q)( -g(x))(l - F(x))F'(x) 
- F'(x)(l - q) r (-g(z)F'(z)) dz + q(l - g(x))F'(x) = O. 
z=q 
Substituting for g(.) results in the equation 
Or 
x qF'(z) 
-xF(x) + f 1 _ (1 _ ) ( ) dz = O. 
z=q q F z 
q 
-xF(x) - --In(l - (1 - q)F(x)) = O. 1-q 
(5) 
For x < q, the only solution to this functional equation is F(x) = O. But 
above q, another, positive solution exists, and the locus of these positive 
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solutions is increasing and continuous in x. (To see this, substitute z = 
1 - (1 - q)F and write the equation for the inverse function as x = 
-q In z/(l - z). It is not hard to check that this x is continuous and 
monotone decreasing in z on [q, 1].) The expression for the upper limit of 
the support of F is obtained by setting F(x) = 1 and solving for x. 
A deviation by a O-type in the first auction below q with any second-
auction companion is no better than q with that same companion. To see 
if the O-types would gain by deviating into the support of H, we calculate 
the derivative of a O-type's payoffs in this region (when the companion bid 
is one in the second auction, which has to be the best companion for such 
a deviation), and it is negative. This means that any such deviation (and 
hence any above the support of H, too) is no better than the deviation 
- q In q /(1-q), which is itself unprofitable. 
That the I-types do best by bidding 3 in the second auction is obvious. 
To determine the I-types' first-auction randomization with this companion, 
consider overall expected payoffs against equilibrium play by the others: 
q2 r (3 - z)2H(z)H'(z) dz 
z=(-qlnq)/O-q) 
+ 2q(1 - q) r (2 - z)H'( z) dz 
z=(-q In q)/(l-q) 
+(1 - q)2t-qlnq);o-q)(1 - z)2F(z)F'(z) dz 
z=q 
+ 2q(1 - q)(l - H(x)) t-qlnq )/O-q)(2 - g(z))F'(z) dz. (6) 
z=q 
Next check that with the g and H specified in Section 2.2, overall expected 
payoffs are constant on the support of H. A deviation above the support 
does not gain relative to the top of the support, and a deviation to x in the 
support of F (with best companion 3 in the second auction) produces 
2q(1 - q) t-qlnq)/o-q)(2 - g(z))F'(z) dz 
z=q 
2jX +(1 - q) (1 - z)2F(z)F'(z) dz 
z=q 




Using the break-even conditions for the O-types in the two auctions, the 
last three terms of (7) are seen to equal 
(1 - q)2(F2(X) + 2(1 - F(x»F(x») 
- 2q(1 - q) r (1 - g(z»F'(z) dz 
z=q 
+(1 - q)2(1 - F(X»2 - 2q(1 - q) 
x t-q1nq)/O-q\1 - g(z»F'(z) dz, 
Z=X 
which, after some algebra, just equals the third term in (6). Since the 
bidder is indifferent over the support of H, his expected payoff from not 
deviating can be calculated by evaluating (6) at -q In q/(l - q). The first 
two terms of this expression vanish, and the fourth term becomes equal to 
the first term in (7). Altogether then, we have shown that a deviation into 
the support of F (with best companion bid in the second auction) does no 
better (and no worse) than a bid in the support of H (with companion 3). 
A deviation below this support is obviously no better than a bid at its lower 
limit. 
Expected prices at the equilibrium from Section 2.2 
First, EgF = - q In q /(1 - q); this follows from evaluating (5) at x = 
-q In q/(l - q). To show that 
(
l- q + q ln q ) 
EF1:2 = 2q 2 ' (-1 + q) 
use the previous result and the break-even condition for the O-types in the 
first auction at x = -q In q/(l - q). Similarly, integrating (4) leads to 
EgF2:2 = EF!:2' 
Multiplying both sides of (4) by (1 - F(x»F'(x), substituting this into 
the definition of EgF3:3' and simplifying results in 
_ ( -1 + 4q - 3q2 + 2q2 In q ) 
EgF3'3 - 1.5q 3' 
. (q - 1) 
To compute EF2:3, first note that 
EF2:3 = 3EF1:2 - 6t-QlnQ)/O-q)zF2(z)F'(z) dz. 
Z=Q 
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Substituting for zF(z) by using (5), we get 
j(-qlnq)/O-q) (fz ) EF2:3 = 3EF1:2 - 6 z=q F(z) y=/(y)F'(y) dy F'(z) dz. 
Integration by parts results in EF2:3 = EgF3:3. 
Finally, routine calculations show that 
Thus, 
Equilibrium from Section 3 
We hypothesize an equilibrium in which the O-informed bid ° in the first 
auction, the I-informed bid according to the c.dJ. I, and the uninformed 
bid according to the c.dJ. U, the supports of both I and U being subsets of 
[0,1]. Assuming differentiability, except possibly at 0, the expected payoff 
to a I-informed bidding z E (0, 1] is 
2 [ 1:=0 xI'(x)U2(x) dx + 21:=0 xI'(x)U(x)I(x) dxj 
I(z)U (z) 1 - I(z)U 2(z) 
+ f I'(x)U 2(x) dx. 
x=z 
For indifference to hold on the interior of the support of I, the derivative 
of this expression with respect to z must be 0. Simplified, that condition 
becomes 
2(1 - z)I(z)U'(z) 
I'(z) = ( ) . zU z 
Similarly, the expected payoff to an uninformed bidding z E (0, 1] is 
-U() x=o + -I2( )U( ) 1 [-f Z xU'(x) dx] 1 2 z U(z) 2 z z 
X 1 - . [ 
21:=0 xI'(x)I(x)U(x) dx + 1:=0 xU'(x)I 2(x) dxj 
12(z)U(z) 
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Differentiating as above and simplifying results in 
2I(z)l'(z)U(z)(1 - z) 
U' ( z) - ------,:-------::---
- z-12(z)+zI 2 (z) 
Substituting the expression for l' into that for U' yields 
Z2 
12 ( Z) = -------;;-
4 - 7z + 3z 2 ' 
Notice 12(0) = 0, and 12 increases on [0, 6/7]. To find the upper 
limit for the support, we set Z2 = 4 - 7z + 3z 2, which produces z = 
(7 ± m) / 4. Taking the upper limit of the support of I to be 
7 -m 
--4- == 0.72 < 6/7, 
therefore, results in a c.d.f. Substituting the expression for I back into the 
expression for U' generates the differential equation 
(8 - 7z)U(z) 
U'(z) = 2 
4(1 -z) (4 - 3z) 
Taking the initial condition to be U«7 - m)/4) = 1, standard argu-
ments show that it has a unique solution on [0, (7 - m) / 4] which is 
(m - 3)(4 - 3z) U(z) = e(1/(3-ji7))+(1/(4-4x)) (3m - 5)(1 - z) , 
an increasing function with U(O) > 0, and therefore a c.dJ. By con-
struction, the I-informed and the uninformed are indifferent over the 
supports of their mixtures. Neither type can gain by bidding either above 
(7 - m) / 4 or below 0. Similarly, the O-informed cannot gain by making 
nonzero bids, so I and U generate an equilibrium. 
That there can be no other type-symmetric equilibria in the game is easy 
to verify: Neither I nor U can have mass points other than at 0, both must 
have the same supports, and the common support can contain no gaps. 
The derivation above, therefore, rules out all other possibilities. 
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